Recent Shai-Hulud style supply chain attacks reveal a fundamental shift in how modern compromises occur. Instead of breaching organizations, attackers increasingly target individual developer environments where untrusted code execution, credentials, and release authority already coexist. For open source maintainers, the personal laptop has quietly become a critical supply chain tier. This talk focuses on open source and independent developers who publish software without corporate security teams, managed endpoints, or centralized monitoring. Traditional enterprise security guidance assumes infrastructure, staffing, and controls that do not exist at this scale, leaving solo maintainers exposed despite following established best practices. Rather than revisiting attack mechanics, this session introduces a defensive model designed specifically for single-user environments. The goal is not perfect prevention, but survivability: reducing blast radius, detecting compromise early, and enabling fast, credible recovery. The talk explores how individual developers can introduce high-signal controls around outbound behavior, credential trust boundaries, release workflows, and environmental auditing without attempting to replicate enterprise security programs. Attendees will learn how to think about their personal development environment as a production system, how to apply intentional friction where it matters, and how to design workflows that assume compromise without normalizing it. All examples are tool-agnostic, incremental, and realistic for individual developers. This session is aimed at OSS maintainers, solo developers, and security engineers who publish software without organizational security backing and want to remain resilient in an increasingly hostile software supply chain ecosystem.